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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS*
By JOSEPIT O'MEARA, JR.**

In diversity-of-citizenship cases Erie v. Tompkins' has been
extended to the field of conflict of laws by Klaxon Co. v.Stentor
Electric Mfg. -Co.2 This "prohibition ... against ... independent
3
determination by the federal courts" of choice-of-law problems
is in line with an earlier pronouncement, in Kryger v. Wilson 4
in 1916, that "a mistaken application of doctrines of the conflict
of laws . . . being purely a question of local common law, is a

matter with which [the United States Supreme Court] is not concerned," 5 and with the repeated declaration that "the Constitution ... does not guarantee that the decisions of state courts shall
be free from error. ' ' 6
*This paper was prepared for presentation before the Association of
Life Insurance Counsel. Questions which may arise when a judgment of one
state is sued on in another are not considered.
*--Attorney at Law, Cincinnati and Columbus, Ohio.
1(1938) 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487.
In Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1938) 304 U. S. 202, 58 S. Ct. 860,
82 L. Ed. 1290, the rule of the Erie case was held applicable to actions on
insurance policies. Similarly in Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, (1939) 308
U. S. 208, 60 S. Ct. 201, 84 L. Ed. 196, and Palmer v. Hoffman, (U.S.
1943) 63 S. Ct. 477, it was held that the question of the burden of proof
is a question of local substantive law which federal courts in diversity-ofcitizenship cases must apply. See Note (1940) 128 A. L. R. 405 (presumptions, burden of proof and sufficiency of evidence). As to the application of the Erie case in respect to the parol evidence rule see Note (1942)
141 A. L. R. 1043. And, generally, see Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Run RiotExtensions of the Erie Case, (1943) 31 Ky. L. J. 99.
Whether the rule of the Erie case applies in equity remains undecided.
See Jackson, J., concurring in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., (1942) 315 U. S. 447, 467, n. 3, 62 S. Ct. 676, 86 L. Ed. 956:
"[The] effect [of Erie v. Tompkins] even in [diversity] cases seems not to
have been definitely settled. In an equity case it was said that 'the doctrine
applies though the question of construction arises not in an action at law, but
in a suit in equity.' Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1938) 304 U. S. 202,
205, 58 S. Ct. 860, 82 L. Ed. 1290. That case was in the federal courts by
reason of diversity jurisdiction. In a later case in which a suit in equity
was brought in federal court to enforce liability under a federal statute
the Court said: 'The Rules of Decision Act does not apply to suits in
equity .... In the circumstances we have no occasion to consider the extent
to which the federal courts, in the exercise of the authority conferred
upon them by Congress to administer equitable remedies, are bound to
follow state statutes and decisions affecting those remedies.' Russell v.
Todd, 309 U. S. 280, 287, 294." Subsequently the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that federal courts have authority to grant equitable remedies
in accordance with their own rules regardless of state practice. Black &
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In another line of cases, 7 beginning before Kryger v. Wilson
and extending to John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates"
in 1936, the Supreme Court set aside on constitutional grounds
what it regarded as an erroneous choice of law by state courts.9
Yates v. Mahogany Assn., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 227, cert.
den. (U.S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 76. See Cook, The Federal Courts and the
Conflict of Laws, (1942) 36 Il1. L. Rev. 493, 521-2.
Under the doctrine of the Erie case it is the duty of the federal courts
to ascertain what the state law is from all available data; the decisions of
intermediate state courts must be followed in the absence of convincing
t.vidence that the highest court of the state would decide differently. West v.
American Telephone and Telegraph Co., (1940) 311 U. S. 223, 61 S. Ct.
179, 85 L. Ed. 139; Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1940) 311 U. S. 464,
(1 S. Ct. 336, 85 L. Ed. 284. But where the lower federal courts are applying local law the Supreme Court will not set aside their ruling except on
a plain showing of error. Palmer v. Hoffman, (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 477.
In the interpretation and application of federal statutes, federal not local
law applies; the doctrine of the Erie case is inapplicable. Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, (1942) 316 U. S. 89, 62 S. Ct. 978, 86 L. Ed. 1293;
Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., (U.S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 172;
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., (U.S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 246; Wragg v.
Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 273. See Note
(1942) 140 A. L. R. 717.
;(1941) 313 U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477. See Notes
(1936) 100 A. L. R. 950; (1941) 132 A. L. R. 470; (1941) 134 A. L. R.
1468. In D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., (1942) 315
U. S. 447, 456, 62 S. Ct. 676, 86 L. Ed. 956, reb. den. 315 U. S. 830. 62
S. Ct. 910, 86 L. Ed. 1224, the question was expressly reserved "whether
the rule of the Klaxon case applies where federal jurisdiction is not based
on diversity of citizenship."
:4Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496, 61 S. Ct.
1020. 85 L. Ed. 1477. See Cook, The Federal Courts and the Conflict of
Laws. (1942) 36 Ill. L. Rev. 493. Prof. Cook argues that the federal courts
should be permitted to determine which state law applies to transactions
factually connected with more than one state.
(1916) 242 U. S. 171, 176, 37 S. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed. 229.
--Cf. Fauntleroy v. Lum, (1908) 210 U. S. 230, 28 S. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed.
1039; Williams v. North Carolina, (U.S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 207.
"Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, (1937) 302 U. S. 292, 299, 58
S. Ct. 185, 82 L. Ed. 268: Texas v. Florida, (1939) 306 U. S. 398, 410,
59 S. Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817.
,See Notes (1931) 74 A. L. R. 710; (1933) 82 A. L. R. 709; (1934)
92 A. L. R. 932; (1936) 100 A. L. R. 1143; (1941) 134 A. L. R. 1472.
,(1936) 299 U. S. 178, 57 S. Ct. 129, 81 A. L. R. 106.
"See Carnahan, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts, (1942)
39-84; Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 421; Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court
top Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, (1926) 39
Harv. L. Rev. 533; Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for
Public Acts, (1929) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 383; Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws
15 MINNFSOTA LAW
Become a Branch of Constitutional Law? (1931)
Rrxim:w 161; Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, (1933) 81 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 371; Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System, (1936)
20 MINxNEsOTA LAW REv'mw 140; Hilpert and Cooley, The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law, (1939) 25 Wash. U. L. Quar. 27; Smith,
The Constitution and the Conflict of Laws, (1939) 27 Georgetown L. J. 536.
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In some it rested decision on the Fourteenth Amendment ;10o in
some on the full faith and credit clause;"' in others the precise
ground is uncertain.

12

The leading case holding the forum's choice of law violative of
the Fourteenth Amendment is Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,13 decided
in 1930. In that case the Court held the application of the statute
of limitations of the forum (Texas, where Dick resided) as
against a shorter period fixed by the contract in suit, which was
made and to be performed in Mexico to whose laws it "was
expressly made subject," was a denial of due process. The Court
said:
"It [i.e., the Texas statute] may not validly affect contracts
which
41
are neither made nor are to be performed in Texas."'
The Dick case was followed in 1934 in Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co.15 As in the Dick case
the court of the forum (Mississippi, plaintiff's domicile) followed
the Mississippi statute of limitations instead of a shorter contractual period incorporated in the fidelity bond sought to be recovered
on, which had been executed and delivered in Tennessee. The decision extended the Dick case inasmuch as the defendant was authorized to do and was doing business in Mississippi, the bond
covered defalcations there as well as elsewhere and the misappropriation actually occurred in Mississippi, whereas in the Dick
case nothing whatever was done or to be done in Texas. At the
same time the holding restricted the Dick case by suggesting that
the propriety of the forum's choice of its own rule depends on
the relative importance of its interest in the matter,' 6 whereas the
Dick case was absolute in its condemnation of the forum's refusal
to give effect to the engagement of the parties.
The latest and perhaps the leading case holding the forum's
10New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, (1918) 246 U. S. 357, 38 S. Ct.
337, 62 L. Ed. 772; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, (1930) 281 U. S. 397, 50 S. Ct.
338, 74 L. Ed. 926; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine
Land Co., (1934) 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178, reh. den. 292
U. S. 607, 54 S. Ct. 772, 78 L. Ed. 1468.
"Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, (1932) 286 U. S. 145, 52
S. Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed. 1026; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates,
(1936) 299 U. S. 178, 57 S.Ct. 129, 81 L. Ed. 106; cf. Broderick v. Rosner,
(1935) 294 U. S.629, 55 S. Ct. 589, 79 L. Ed. 1100.
12New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, (1914) 234 U. S. 149, 34 S. Ct.
879, 58 L. Ed. 1259; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, (1924) 266 U. S. 389,
45 S. Ct. 129, 60 L. Ed. 342.
"3(1930) 281 U. S. 397, 50 S. Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926.
14Id. at 410.
"r(1934) 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178.
13Id. at 150.
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choice of law violative of the full faith and credit clause1 7 is
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates," decided in 1936,
in which the Supreme Court of Georgia was reversed for refusing
to give effect to a statute of New York where the policy in suit
was applied for, issued and delivered and where the insured resided."" The Court said:
"The company sets up as a defense a substantive right conferred
by a statute of New York. .

.

. In respect to the accrual of the

right asserted under the contract, or liability denied, there was no
occurrence, nothing done, to which the law of Georgia could
apply. Compare Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 408.
To sustain the defense involves merely recognition by the courts
of Georgia that the parties have by their contract made in New
York subjected themselves to certain conditions prescribed by its
statute. . . . As construed by the highest court of the State, the
statute . . . enacts a rule of substantive law which became a term
of the contract . . . as fully as if a provision to that effect had

been embodied in writing in the policy. To refuse to give that
defense effect would irremediably subject the Company to liability." -",
Even before the Yates case, however, a new attitude began to
be reflected in the Court's decisions, first clearly evidenced by
Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm.2 1 in 1935.
That case upheld an award made in California under its workmen's compensation act to a non-resident alien injured in the
course of his duties under a contract of employment executed in
California, notwithstanding the contract stipulated that the parties should be subject to and bound by the compensation law of
Alaska where the injuries occurred.
In Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm.,"
which followed in 1939, the Court refused to disturb an award
made in California under California law in favor of a non-resident
injured while working temporarily in California under a contract
of employment made in Iassachusetts where he resided and was
17U. S. Const. Art. IV, See. 1.
"'(1936) 299 U. S. 178, 57 S. Ct. 129, 81 L. Ed. 106.

UlThat a statute is a "public act" within the compass of the full faith
and credit clause was first squarely held in Bradford Electric Light Co. v.
Clapper, (1932) 286 U. S. 145, 52 S.Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed. 1026. See Carnahan,
Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts, (1942) 44-50.
'-'299 U. S. 178, 182-183, 57 S. Ct. 129, 81 L. Ed. 106. Accord: Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, (1932) 286 U. S. 145, 160, 52 S. Ct. 571,
76 L. Ed. 1026.
,21(1935) 294 U. S. 532, 55 S. Ct. 518, 79 L. Ed. 1044. Cf. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., (1934) 292 U. S.
143, 150, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178.
22(1939) 306 U. S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed. 940.
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regularly employed and by whose compensation act he had consented to be bound.
In these cases the Supreme Court held that neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the full faith and credit clause prevented
California from applying its own statute rather than that of
another jurisdiction. They mark a clear departure from the attitude exemplified by the Dick and Yates cases.
The most extreme expression of the Court's present outlook
and approach is found in Griffin v. McCoach,23 decided in 1941.
One Gordon persuaded a group of New Yorkers to finance certain business ventures he was promoting in Texas where he
resided. To secure their advances Gordon's backers procured a
policy of insurance on his life; they were the beneficiaries and
paid the premiums. The policy was applied for and delivered in
New York, payable in New Jersey.24 Subsequently, by mutual
agreement, Gordon relinquished certain rights and powers vested
in him by the provisions of the policy, in consideration of the
payment to him of a percentage of any disability benefits and
of the payment to his wife of a like proportion of the proceeds
at his death. The papers effectuating this agreement were executed
by Gordon in Texas, forwarded to and executed by the creditorbeneficiaries in New York and sent from there to the insurer in
New Jersey. Later three of the creditor-beneficiaries severally
assigned their interest in the policy. Each of these assignments
was executed and delivered in New York by and to a resident of
that state, and the assignees thereafter paid a proportionate part
of the premiums. At Gordon's death his administrator sued the
insurer in the federal district court in Texas to recover for the
estate so much of the policy proceeds as was covered by these
transfers on the ground that, though valid in New York, the assignments were invalid in Texas because the assignees did not
have an insurable interest in Gordon's life. The insurer interpleaded the New York assignees, for whom judgment was entered. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground
that "to apply the laws of Texas to the New York contracts
would constitute an unwarranted extraterritorial control of contracts and regulation of business outside of Texas in disregard
23(1941) 313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481, 134 A. L. R.
1462. Accord: Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Meinsen, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 176.
"4The fact that the policy was payable in New Jersey has been verified
by the insurer.

CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

505

of the laws of New York." 25 The Supreme Court reversed on the
ground that the court below should have applied Texas law,
saying:
"Rights acquired by contract outside a state are enforced within a state, certainly where its own citizens are concerned; but that
principle excepts claimed rights so contrary to the law of the
forum as to subvert the forum's view of public policy. ... It is for
the state to say whether a contract contrary to [its] statute or rule
as to require its
of law is so offensive to its view of public welfare
2 6courts to close their doors to its enforcement.
27
Of the cases beginning with Ne-w York Life Ins. Co. v. Head
in 1914 which upset state court solutions of conflicts problems on
constitutional grounds, the Head case and Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunken21 were disposed of on the ground that the effect of the
forum's public policy was not discussed or appraised ;29 New York
Life Ins. Co. "v.Dodge ° and John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.

z'. Vates :1 were distinguished on the facts ;32 Bradford Electric
Light Co. z'. Clappc'r- and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. V.
Delta & Pine Land Co.34 were cited for the assertion that "where
this Court has required the state of the forum to apply ... foreign
law under the full faith and credit clause or under the Fourteenth
Amendment, it has recognized that a state is not required to enforce a law obnoxious to its public policy."' 5 Speaking of the
Dick case the Court said that the "rule" expressed in the passage
just quoted "was not applied where the parties to [a] contract
acquired rights beyond the state's borders with no relation to any-(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1941) 116 F. (2d) 261, 264. Accord: Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunken, (1924) 266 U. S.389, 399, 45 S. Ct. 129, 60 L. Ed. 342.
("The Te. as statute was incapable of being constitutionally applied . . .
since the effect of such application would be to regulate business outside
the state of Texas and control contracts made by citizens of other states,
in disregard of their laws. . .")

'3l3 U. S. 498, 506-7, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481. Cf. United States
v. Pink, (1942) 315 U. S. 203, 62 S. Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 796. (The rule of
the Griffin case "must give way before the superior Federal policy evidenced
by a treaty or international compact or agreement.")
7(1914) 234 U. S. 149, 34 S. Ct. 879, 58 L. Ed. 1259.
2(1924) 266 U. S. 389, 45 S.Ct. 129, 60 L. Ed. 342.
1-'(1941) 313 U. S. 498, 505-6, 61 S.Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481.
'(918) 246 U. S. 357, 38 S. Ct. 337, 62 L. Ed. 772.
31(1936) 299 U. S. 178, 57 S.Ct. 129, 81 L. Ed. 106.
"!'The former in the Griffin case, (1941) 313 U. S.498, 507, 61 S. Ct.
Co.,
1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481 ; the latter in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric M%1fg.
(1941) 313 U. S. 487, 497-8, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477. The Dodge case
in effect was overruled by futual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, (1922) 259 U. S.
209, 42 S. Ct. 467, 66 L. Ed. 900.
'13(1932) 286 U. S.145, 52 S.Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed. 1026.
3,1(1934) 292 U. S.143, 54 S.Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178, reh. den. 292 U. S.
607, 54 S. Ct. 772, 78 L. Ed. 1468.
35(1941) 313 U. S.498, 507, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481.
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thing done or to be done within the borders."3G None of these
cases was expressly disapproved.
Professor Carnahan has expressed the view that "the decision
in the Griffin case is not inconsistent with that in the Dick case"
because, the insurer having interpleaded and thus admitted liability, "its obligation was in no respect increased by imposition of
the forum's conflict of laws rule," whereas in the Dick case
"application of the state rule created and imposed a liability where
none existed under the law properly applicable." 37 There are, of
course, differences between the two cases-any case can be distinguished from every other case on some ground; but the facts
in the Griffin case and the defense based thereon so closely parallel
the facts and the defense in the Dick case that the divergent results
are impossible to reconcile.
In the Dick case the controversy was between a resident plaintiff and two New York reinsurers who had been brought involuntarily into a Texas court by writs of garnishment; in the Griffin
case the controversy was between a resident plaintiff and a number of New York assignees who were interpleaded by the insurer
and thus likewise compelled to litigate in a forum not of their own
choosing. In each case the non-resident defendants relied on a
contract made and to be performed outside of Texas and valid
where made. In both cases the contract relied on by the out-ofstate parties was obnoxious to the public policy of Texas, expressed in a statute in the Dick case, in judicial decisions in the
Griffin case.
In the Dick case the Court met the argument predicated on the
public policy of Texas with this absolute and unqualified declaration:
"We need not-consider how far the State may go in imposing
restrictions on the conduct of its own residents, and of foreign
corporations which have received permission to do business within
36Id. Subsequently in Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Pink, (U.S. 1943) 63
S. Ct. 602, 605, n. 3, Mr. Justice Black stated that the "rule [of the Griffin
case, (1941) 313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481, 134 A. L. R.
14621 was not applied where the state had no actual contact with the insurance contract; i.e., where neither the original insured nor the company
were residents of the state, the property insured was elsewhere, and the contract was made elsewhere. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, (1930) 281 U. S.
397, 50 S.Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926, 74 A. L. R. 701." The plaintiff in the Dick
case was assignee of the original insured, who was an alien. In that situation
the fact that the plaintiff, Dick, was a citizen and resident of the forum state
was held to be "without significance."
37See Carnahan, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts, (1942)
76-77.
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its borders; or how far it may go in refusing to lend the aid of its
courts to the enforcement of rights acquired outside its borders.
It may not abrogate the rights of parties acquired outside its
borders having no relation to anything done or to be done within
thcm.: '3f
In the Griffin case the Court said just as unequivocally:
"Rights acquired by contract outside a state are enforced within a state, certainly where its own citizens are concerned; but that
principle e.rcepts claimed rights so contrary to the law of the
forum as to subvert the forum's view of public policy."-"
It is true the opinion in the Griffin case speaks of the constitutional power of Texas courts "to close their doors to [the]
enforcement" of claims recognized elsewhere, 0 which is suggestive
of the basic doctrine of the Dick and Yates cases that "to a defense different considerations apply,"'" best stated in Bradford
Electric Light Co. v. Clapper'2 as follows:
"A state may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause
of action.4 In so doing, it merely denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substantive right, so that he is free to
enforce it elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect to a substantive
the
defense under the applicable law of another state . . . subjects
44
defendant to irremediable liability. This may not be done."
But if that doctrine had been adhered to, the decision in the
Griffin case must have gone the other way. For there was no
question in the Griffin case, any more than in the Dick case, of
merely refusing to entertain a cause of action. Equally in both
cases what was involved was the validity of a contract made and
to be performed elsewhere, which was relied on by out-of-state
defendants who were before the court solely by virtue of compulsory process. What the Supreme Court sanctioned and the
Circuit Court of Appeals did on remand in the Griffin case was
to invalidate the out-of-state contracts relied on by the out-of-state
:,(1930) 281 U. S. 397, 410, 50 S. Ct. 388, 74 L. Ed. 926. Italics added.
3"(1941) 313 U. S.498, 506, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481. Italics
added.
'4d. at 507.
"nBut cf. Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm., d1935)
294 U. S. 532, 547, 55 S. Ct. 518, 79 L. Ed. 1044.
,120932) 286 U. S. 145, 160, 52 S. Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed. 1026.
4
:,Accord: Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) Sec. 612; and see
Jackson, J., concurring in Miles v. Illinois Central Ry., (U.S. 1942) 62
S. Ct. 827, 832. But cf. Broderick v. Rosner, (1935) 294 U. S. 629, 55
S. Ct. 589, 79 L. Ed. 1100.
'1See Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System, (1936) 20
MINNEsoTA LAW REVIEW 140, 175-6; Nussbaum, Public Policy and the
Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, (1940) 49 Yale L. J. 1027, 1033-7.
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defendants, for repugnance to the public policy of Texas.45 That
is precisely what is characterized in the Dick case as a deprivation
of property without due process of law.
To be sure, there is a formal distinction between the two cases
in that a contrary decision in the Dick case would have imposed
a liability beyond that contracted for. But the net effect of the
Griffin case is indistinguishable from what would have been the
result in the Dick case had it gone the other way, namely, abrogation of rights claimed under a contract made and to be performed
elsewhere and there valid. In short, what the non-resident defendants had bargained for was taken from them in the Griffin
case, whereas the same result in the Dick case was held forbidden
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Plainly, therefore, the considerations deemed relevant and conclusive in the Dick case were not so
regarded in the Griffin case; the drift and emphasis of the latter
cannot be squared with the former.
It is possible to argue. of course, that a state's interest in the
lives of its residents which is sought to be protected by confining
the benefits of insurance to those having an insurable interest, has
a greater claim to recognition than its concern with the problems
regulated by a statute of limitations. But neither case was decided
on any such basis.4" On the contrary the insistence in the Dick
case was on the inviolability of rights vested under a contract
made and to be performed elsewhere. In the Grii5'n case, on the
other hand, the emphasis is on the supremacy of the forum's conception of public polic--"the principle [that rights acquired by
contract outside a state are enforced within it] excepts claimed
rights so contrary to the law of the forum as to subvert the
forumn's view of public policy." 47
Substantially that position was urged upon the Court in the
Dick case, to no purpose. Its avowal in the Griffin case, if taken
45(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 550, cert. den. (1942) 316 U. S.
683, 62 S. Ct. 1270, 86 L. Ed. 1755 ("Even if the assignees are claiming
under foreign contracts which are not governed by the law of Texas, nevertheless we -think the administrator is entitled to recover, because . . . it is
against the public policy of the State of Texas to allow anyone who has
no insurable interest to be the owner of a policy of insurance upon the life
of a 46human being.")
Relying on the Griffin case the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Meinsen, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1942)
131 F. (2d) 176, applied the statute of limitations of the forum, Missouri,
as against a shorter contractual period in the certificate in suit which was
issued in Ohio where the contractual limitation was valid, on the ground
that it violated Missouri's public policy. Neither the Dick case nor Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. was mentioned.
47(1941) 313 U. S. 498, 506, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481. Italics
added.
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at face value, makes the state court the final arbiter of the public
policy of the forum 45 and allows its policy, as so determined, full
and unrestricted play.
But it is evident that the language in question cannot be accepted wholly without qualification or reservation. In the later
case of Pink v. A. A. A. Highway E.rpress"' the Court explicitly
reserved for decision when they arise questions resulting from a
conflict of interest between the forum and another jurisdiction,"0
and appears, moreover, to have placed specific limitation on the
broad generalization of the Griffin case.
In the Pink case the Court reaffirmed the "familiar rule that
those who become stockholders in a corporation subject themselves to liability for assessment . . . in conformity to the statutes
of the state of its organization," 5'1 declaring categorically that "a
necessary consequence of becoming a stockholder is the assumption of those obligations which, by the laws governing the organization and management of the corporation, attach to stock ownership.'': That substantially confirms the view expressed in
Brodcrick v. Rosner53 in 1935 that liability for "assessment is an
incident of... incorporation [and] thus . . . peculiarly within the
regulatory power of . . . the state of incorporation. 'So much
so ... that no other State properly can be said to have any public
policy thereon.'" The Court held, however, that, although the
obligations of members of a mutual insurance company are determined by the "laws"'" of the state of organization, the question
-See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, (1900) 178 U. S. 389, 398,
20 S. Ct. 962, 44 L. Ed. 1116 ("... the interests of the State must be deemed
to be expressed in its laws. The public policy of the State must be
deemed to be authoritatively declared by its courts") ; Bond v. Hume, (1917)
243 U. S. 15, 22,.37 S. Ct. 366. 61 L. Ed. 365 (" .. . it is peculiarly within
the province of the law-making power to define the public policy of [a]
state")
Clark v. 11rilliard, (1935) 294 U. S. 211, 212. 55 S. Ct. 356, 79
L. Ed. 865 ("As to that question [i.e., whether there was any local policy,
expressed in statute or decision] the Supreme Court of [the forum] would
speak the final word") ; Griffin v. McCoach, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1941, on remand) 123 F. (2d) 550, 551, cert. den. (1942) 316 U. S. 683, 62 S. Ct. 1270,
86 L. Ed. 1755 ("The public policy of Texas, as announced by its highest
court, is binding upon us. . . . The public policy of [a] state does not
depend exclusively upon legislation, but may be the result of judicial construction and announcement") ; Order of United Commercial Travelers v.
Meinscn, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 176 ("By the public policy
of a state is meant 'the law of the State, whether found in the constitution,
the statutes or judicial records'").
',',(1941) 314 U. S. 201, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86 L. Ed. 152, reh. den. 314
U. S. 716, 62 S. Ct. 477, 86 L. Ed. 570.
'oId. at 247.
,'Id. at 245. Accord: Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) Sec. 185.
-'(1941) 314 U. S. 201, 208, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86 L. Ed. 152.
',3(1935) 294 U. S. 629, 643, 55 S. Ct. 589, 79 L. Ed. 1100.
',(1941) 314 U. S. 201, 208, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86 L. Ed. 152.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

whether a particular policyholder is or is not a member may
properly be decided by the forum according to its own "laws and
policy" 55 without offending the full faith and credit clause.56
No relevant distinction can be drawn between claims against
corporate shareholders or members arising out of that relation
and claims by them in virtue of their status as shareholders or
members, the latter being equally an incident of incorporation.
Hence the same standard which defines the duties must likewise
prescribe the rights attaching to corporate membership, namely,
the law of the chartering state. So it was held in Supreme Council
of Royal Arcanum v. Green 7 in 1915 and Modern Woodmen v.
Mixe 5 8 in 1925, both of which were cited with approval in the
Pink case. 9 Thus in the Green case the Court looked "to the laws
[of the chartering state] to determine the powers of the corporation and the rights and duties of its members." 60 Plainly, then,
the Pink case recognizes that, notwithstanding the Klaxon and
Grifflin cases, all questions growing out of the corporate relationship must be determined by the "laws" of the state of incorporation.
In the, Green and Mi1xer cases and in other similar cases
(HartfordLife Ins. Co. v. Ibs 61 Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber2'
and Sovereign Camp v. Bolin63) a member of a mutual insurance
association asserted against it rights claimed to arise by reason
of his membership; in each the association relied on a prior adjudication by-the court of last resort of the state by which it had
been chartered, in an action against it involving the same question; in none had the member therein seeking relief been a party
to the former proceeding; in all the Court held the prior judgment
conclusive of the present controversy. In the Green, Ibs, Barber
and Bolin cases the prior judgment was obtained in a class suit;
in the fixer case, on the other hand, the previous judgment was
secured in an action brought by another member solely in his own
behalf. Taken together these cases hold that the legal relations
flowing from membership, as such, in a mutual insurance company are settled and determined for all members and all jurisdictions to the extent that they -are adjudicated by the courts of the
55
1d.
56

But cf. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) Sec. 182.
57(1915) 237 U. S. 531, 35 S. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed. 1089.
58(1925) 267 U. S. 544, 45 S. Ct. 389, 69 L. Ed. 783, 41 A. L. R. 1386.
59(1941) 314 U. S. 201, 208, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86 L. Ed. 152.
60(1915) 237 U. S. 531, 546, 35 S. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed. 1089.
61(1915) 237 U. S. 662, 35 S. Ct. 692, 59 L. Ed. 1165.
62(1917) 245 U. S. 146, 38 S. Ct. 54, 62 L. Ed. 208.
63(1938) 305 U. S. 66, 59 S. Ct. 35, 83 L. Ed. 45, 119 A. L. R. 483.
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chartering state in an action to which the company is a party.6"
And that holding evidently has not been disturbed by the Klaxon
and Griffin cases inasmuch as the subsequent Pink case cited the
Green and Mi.rer cases with approval.
More than that, however, was involved in the Green, Mixer
and related cases ;6 they stand for a much more fundamental
proposition, namely, that all questions of corporate relationship
must be decided according to the law of the chartering state,
whether statutory or otherwise.
The language of the opinions in these cases is ambiguous and
perplexing and the decisions have been variously interpreted. 6
There is no question, however, that in each case a prior judgment
was relied on by the corporate defendant and that in each the
defense was upheld. It is wholly plain, moreover, that this result
would not have followed had the previous judgment been rendered
in a state other than the state of incorporation.17 In each instance
the judgment was held entitled to full faith and credit only because it was a judgment of the chartering state. This appears
most clearly in the Ibs case and in the Green case which relied
on the lbs case and in turn was held controlling in the Mixer
case. Thus in the Green case the Court was at pains to emphasize:
...as the charter was a Massachusetts charter and the constitu6 1These cases involved incorporated fraternal benefit associations doing
business on the assessment plan. Prof. Carnahan contends that they should

not be followed in the case of old-line mutual insurance companies. Carna-

han, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts, (1942) 152-3. But
there is nothing in the Pink case suggestive of any such distinction. The
insurer there involved was not a fraternal benefit association. It charged
a stated premium but was vested by statute with a limited power of assessment. Similarly the fraternals now operate on a level premium basis but
uniformly reserve power to augment their funds by means of assessment.
Maclean, Life Insurance, (5th ed. 1939) 427-31; Knight, Advanced Life
Insurance, (1926) C. XX. This distinctive feature of fraternal insurance, i.e.,
liability to assessment, is plainly irrelevant. For in the case of old-line
mutual companies, no less than in the case of the fraternals, losses are
payable only from a common fund resulting from members' contributions.
Equally in both cases the integrity and mutuality of this common fund
requires that it be administered according to a single standard. That standard is provided by the state of incorporation, whose law is the criterion
for determining all questions arising out of any corporate relationship as
such. This latter point, that is, the exclusive applicability of the law of
the corporate domicile, is considered in succeeding paragraphs of the text.
13I.e., Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, (1915) 237 U. S.,662, 35 S. Ct.
692, 59 L. Ed. 1165; Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, (1917) 245 U. S.
146, 38 S. Ct. 54, 62 L. Ed. 208; Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, (1938) 305
U. S.6 66, 59 S. Ct. 35, 83 L. Ed. 45.
"See Carnahan, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts, (1942)
47-50, 133-154.
OfThis is recognized in Eminent Household v. Bryant, (1940) 62 Ga.
App. 167. 8 S. E. (2d) 438.
-S(1925) 267 U. S. 544, 551, 45 S. Ct. 389, 69 L. Ed. 783.

MINNESOTA LAV REVIEW

tion and by-laws were a part thereof, adopted 'in Massachusetts.
having no other sanction than the laws of that state, it follows...
that those laws 'were integrally and necessarily the criterion to be
resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the significance of the
constitution and by-laws . . . if the laws of Massachusetts were

not applicable, the full faith and credit due to the judgment would
require only its enforcement to the extent that it constituted the
thing adjudged as between the parties to the record in the ordinary
sense, and on the other hand, if the Massachusetts law applies, the
full faith and credit due to the judgment additionally exacts that
the right of the corporation to stand in judgment as to all members as to controversies concerning the power and duty to levy
assessments must be recognized, the duty to give effect to the
judgment in such cases being substantially the same as the duty
to enforce the judgment.' ' 69
Plainly, then, more was involved than merely giving full faith and
credit to the judgment of a sister state.
In all but the Mixer case the Court held the present litigants.
that is, the respondents, concluded by the previous judgment because of "the right of the corporation to stand in judgment as to
all members." No statute of the chartering state was cited to
support the authority of the corporation so to represent its absent
members. On the contrary the -Court referred only to general
principles of corporation law assumed to prevail in the state of
organization."0 Hence the holding that the respondents were
bound by the prior judgment, even though not parties to the
record, required the courts of the forum in each instance to adopt
a principle of adjudication having no basis in the statute law of
the incorporating state.
The same is true of the Mirxer case. Although in that case the
principle of representation was inapplicable, the Court nevertheless enforced the prior judgment on the ground that "as marriage
looks to domicile, membership looks to and must be governed by
the law of the State granting incorporation. 1 1 Again no statute
of the chartering state was invoked.
In short, in these cases the Supreme Court required the courts
of the forum to follow the non-statutory law of the corporation's
domicile. The chief among them, the Green and Mixer cases,
were cited and relied on in the Pink case. That case, moreover.
itself declares that the "laws" of the state of incorporation must
69(1915)
237 U. S. 531, 542, 545, 35 S. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed. 1089.
70
1d. at 543-4, 545.
71(1925) 267 U. S. 544, 551, 45 S. Ct. 389. 69 L. Ed. 793. Accord:
Broderick v. Rosner, (1935) 294 U. S. 629, 643-4, 55 S. Ct. 589, 79 L. Ed.
1100.
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govern, without any qualification suggesting that statutes only
were meant. And since then the Court has again held, in Tax
Comnm. v. Aldrich,71 1 that the "law [of a corporation's domicile]
defines the nature and extent of the interest of the shareholders."
On the evidence to date, therefore, the conclusion is that, as regards
all questions arising out of the corporate relationship, courts of
the forum must decide as would the courts of the incorporating
state, notwithstanding the Klaxon and Griffin cases.72
The constitutional sanction for the enforcement in the Green,
Mircr and related cases of the common law of the corporate
domicile, was not identified. It cannot be the full faith and credit
clause. That clause extends only to the public acts, records and
judicial proceedings of a sister state. 2 1 To hold the common law
a public act or record would require a plain distortion of the constitutional phrase, for which there is no precedent.73 Moreover it
would convert every choice-of-law case into a constitutional prob74
lem in the teeth of the Kryger case, recently restored to favor,
and of the Klaxon case holding that federal courts are bound to
follow the conflict of laws rules of the states where they sit, in
diversity actions at law. It can be supported, however, on the
ground that refusal by the forum to follow the law of a corporation's domicile, whatever its origin may be, is an unreasonable
projection of the forum's own law and so a denial of due process.7 5
The Pink case thus demonstrates that the priority apparently
-ranted to local public policy by the broad language of the Griffin
case is not absolute and unlimited. Local policy has always been
316 U. S. 174, 62 S. Ct. 1008, 86 L. Ed. 1358.
7Accord: Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, (1933) 288
U. S. 123. 53 S. Ct. 295, 77 L. Ed. 652, 89 A. L. R. 736; Cohen v. American Window Glass Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942) 126 F. (2d) 111; Restatement. Conflict of Laws (1934) Secs. 183-185, 187, 194 Comment a, 197,
199 Comment a, 200 Comment a.
%2aAetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, (1912) 223 U. S. 185, 32 S. Ct.
309, 56 L. Ed. 398. See Act of May 26, 1790, Chap. 11, U. S. C., tit. 28, sec.
687, 28 U. S. C. A., see. 687, 8 F. C. A., tit. 28, sec. 687 and cf. Yarborough
v. Yarborough. (1933) 290 U. S. 202, 54 S. Ct. 181, 78 L. Ed. 269; Williams
v. North Carolina, (U.S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 207.
7"Cf.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, (1936) 299 U. S. 178,
57 S. Ct. 129, 81 L. Ed. 106; see Abel, Administrative Determinations and
Full Faith and Credit, (1937) 22 Iowa L. Rev. 461.
71
Kryger v. Wilson, (1916) 242 U. S. 171, 37 S. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed. 229,
was cited and relied on in both Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric M%,fg. Co.,
(1941) 313 U. S. 487, 498, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477, and Pink v.
A. A. A. Highway Express, (1941) 314 U. S. 201, 209, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86
L. Ed. 152; likewise in Alropa Corp. v. Kirschwehm, (1941) 313 U. S.
549, 61 S. Ct. 1120, 85 L. Ed. 1514 and Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Pink,
(U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 602, 605, n. 3.
TThe test of constitutional propriety of the forum's choice of its own
rule is stated at page 515 of the text.
7111(1942)
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given more or less weight. 76 The significance of the Klaxon and
Griffin cases lies not in the recognition of local policy but in the
greatly increased deference accorded to it, and in the consequent
abandonment of the doctrine that, while ordinarily the forum may
refuse to entertain a foreign cause of action, it may not refuse to give
effect to a substantive defense under the applicable law of another
jurisdiction.77 In short, the emphasis has shifted from protecting
"vested rights" to respecting state autonomy.776 The view formerly
entertained is illustrated by the following dictum of Mr. Justice
Brandeis:
"It is true that ... the full faith and credit clause does not require the enforcement of every right which has ripened into a
judgment of another state or has been conferred by its statutes....
But the room left for the play of conflicting policies is a nzarrowr
one ....
For the states of the Union, the constitutional limitation

imposed by the full faith and credit clause abolished, in large
measure, the general principle of international law
by which local
76
policy is permitted to dominate rules of comity."

The contrast is obvious between that and the attitude expressed in
the Griffin case which follows very closely the dissenting opinion
of the present Chief Justice in Yarborough v. Yarborough :79
*".. it would not seem open to serious question that every state
has an interest in securing the maintenance and support of minor
children residing within its own territory so complete and so vital
to the performance of its functions as a government, that no
other state could set limits upon it. Of that interest South Carolina
is the sole mistress within her own territory. . . Even though we
might appraise it more lightly than' does South Carolina, it is not
for us to say that a state is not free, within constitutional limitations, to regard that interest as fully as important and as completely
within the realm of state power as the legal incidents of land
located within its boundaries, or of a marriage relationship,
wherever entered into but of which it is the domicile, or its power
76Bond v. Hume, (1917) 243 U. S. 15, 37 S. Ct. 366, 61 L. Ed. 565;
Union Trust Co. v. Grossman, (1918) 245 U. S. 412, 38 S. Ct. 147, 62 L. Ed.
368; Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., (1927) 275 U. S. 274, 48 S. Ct. 124,
72 L. Ed. 277; Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, (1932) 286 U. S.
145, 52 S. Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed. 1026; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Delta & Pine Land Co., (1934) 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed.
1178; Clark v. Williard, (1935) 294 U. S. 211, 55 S. Ct. 356, 79 L. Ed.
865; see Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict
of Laws,
(1940) 49 Yale L. J. 1027.
7
7See note 46 supra.
77
aThe reverse is true when a judgment of one state is relied on in the
courts of another state. Williams v. North Carolina, (U.S. 1942) 63 S. Ct.
207. 75Broderick
v. Rosner, (1935) 294 U. S. 629, 642-3,
55 S. Ct. 589, 79
L. Ed. 1100. Italics added. Accord as to judgments: Williams v. North
Carolina, (U.S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 207.
79(1933) 290 U. S. 202, 225-6, 54 S. Ct. 181, 78 L. Ed. 269.
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to pass upon the sanity of its own residents, notwithstanding the
earlier pronouncements of the courts of other states."
The full faith and credit clause applies only to the public acts,
records and judicial proceedings of a sister state; due process, on
the other hand, forbids the "undue extension" of the forum's
own law,' whether statutory or judge-made.8 The ultimate question, however, is the same, namely, whether the forum constitutionally may decide a given case otherwise than it would be
decided in another jurisdiction; and precisely the same test is
applied whether one or other of the constitutional provisions is
invoked. *' Hence it makes little if any practical difference that
the out-of-state law relied on by a party is that of a foreign
sovereign or the non-statutory law of a sister state, the net result,
in that event, being merely that reliance must be placed on the
Fourteenth Amendment to the exclusion of the full faith and
credit clause.si Whatever the source and character of the allegedly
applicable out-of-state rule, the test is whether the forum has a
"domestic interest" or "governmental interest" in the controversy
sufficient to warrant decision according to its own "law and policy"
to the prejudice of a party contending that decision must conform
to what the courts of some other jurisdiction presumably would
hold.-"' The clearest statement of the proposition appears in the
Alaska Packers case, which involved both due process and full
faith and credit, as follows:
-Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm., (1935) 294 U. S.
532, 540, 55 S.Ct. 518, 79 L. Ed. 1044; Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express,
(1941) 314 U. S.201, 211, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86 L. Ed. 152; see Stone, J., dissenting in Yarborough v. Yarborough, (1933) 290 U. S.202, 219, 54 S.Ct. 181,
78 L. Ed. 269 (". . . the Fourteenth Amendment denies to a state the power
of unduly extending its authority beyond its own borders, by the mere
expedient of rendering a judgment against one of whose person or property
it has acquired jurisdiction.")
'R'See Carnahan, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts, (1942)
81-82; Ross. "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System, (1936) 20
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 140, 180.

'-See Carnahan, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts, (1942)
78-83.
- See Stone, J., dissenting in Yarborough v. Yarborough, (1933) 290
U. S.202. 220, 54 S. Ct. 181, 78 L. Ed. 269 ("Whatever difference there
may be between holding that a judgment is invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment because it is 'extra-territorial,' and in holding that it is not
entitled to full faith and credit although it does not infringe the Fourteenth
Amendment, is one of degree or of a difference in circumstances which may
prevent the operation of the latter provision of the Constitution.")
-Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co.,
(1934) 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178; Alaska Packers Assn.
v. Industrial Accident Comm., (1935) 294 U. S.532, 55 S. Ct. 518, 79 L. Ed.
1044; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., (1939) 306
U. S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed. 940; Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express,
(1941) 314 U. S. 201, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86 L. Ed. 152; Williams v. North
Carolina, (U.S. 1942) 63 S.Ct. 207; cf. Osborn v. Ozlin, (1940) 310 U. S.
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"Objections which are founded upon the Fourteenth Amendment must . . . be directed, not to the existence of the power to

impose liability for an injury outside state borders, but to the
manner of its exercise as being so arbitrary and unreasonable as
to amount to a denial of due process.
California . . . had a legitimate public interest in controlling
Indulging
and regulating this employer-employee relationship ....

the presumption of constitutionality which attaches to every state
statute, we cannot say that this one, as applied, lacks a rational
basis or involved any arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of state
power.
...

Appellant contends that

the full faith and credit clause

...

* compel [s] recognition of the Alaska statute as a defense....
...

the conflict is to be resolved

. .

. by appraising the govern-

mental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of
decision according to their weight.
*

.*

Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own

courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges that
right, because of the force given to a conflicting statute of another
state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of
showing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests
involved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the
forum....
in the present case, only if it appears that, in the conflict
of interests which have found expression in the conflicting statutes,
the interest of Alaska is superior to that of California, is there
rational basis for denying to the courts of California the right to
apply the laws of their own state."s 5
To determine whether the forum's interest is sufficient to warrant decision according to its own law and policy obviously requires
an appraisal of competing considerations of policy and a balancing
of the respective claims of all interested jurisdictions in light of
the factual situation in each case.86 Nevertheless categories are
53, 60 S. Ct. 758, 84 L. Ed. 1074; Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Pink, (U.S.
1943) 63 S. Ct. 602; see Carnahan, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance
Contracts, (1942) 78-83; Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System,

(1936) 20
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140, 176; Hilpert and Cooley, The

Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law, (1939) 25 Wash. U. L. Quar.
27, 41, 46, 55-57.
85(1935) 294 U. S. 532, 541-3, 544, 547-9, 55 S. Ct. 518; 79 L. Ed. 1044.
S6 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., (1934)
292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178; Alaska Packers Assn. v.
Industrial Accident Comm., (1935) 294 U. S. 532, 55 S. Ct. 518, 79 L. Ed.
1044; see Stone, J., dissenting in Yarborough v. Yarborough, (1933) 290
U. S. 202, 215, 219 n. 11, 54 S. Ct. 181, 78 L. Ed. 269 ("In the assertion
of rights defined by a judgment of one state, within the territory of another,
there is often an inescapable conflict of interest of the two states, and
there comes a point beyond which the imposition of the will of one state

CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

517

already forming to one or other of which, as they are multiplied
and defined, each case in its turn will be assigned in the continuing
process of assessing and classifying typical fact patterns. Thus
the Griffin and Pink cases made plain that "the interpretation and
legal effect of policies of insurance entered into [anywhere] by
[a state's inhabitants] .

.

. who are sued upon them in its courts,

are peculiarly matters of local concern." 7 The earlier Pacific
Eniplovers" case recognized that a state has the required domestic
interest in transactions of non-residents occurring within its
borders. As regards the legal relations between corporation and
shareholder, on the other hand, the Pink case indicates that the
interest of the chartering state is paramount,89 doubtless because
of the confusion and inequity that would ensue if every state were
permitted to pass on the internal affairs of every corporation
within reach of its process-each according to its own "law and
policy."' '
On the basis of these cases and of Alaska Packers Assn. v.
Industrial Accident Comm." the general rule may be said to be
that, except in respect of questions growing out of the corporate
relationship, the forum constitutionally may apply its own rule,
whether statutory or not, to any transaction which either takes
place within it or affects its residents-with which, in short, it has
an "actual contact.""",, Doubtless other exceptions and qualificabeyond its own borders involves a forbidden infringement of some legitimate domestic interest of the other. That point may vary with the circumstances of the case . . . the appropriate function of this Court [is]
balancing the interests of local and foreign sovereign.")
'7(1941 ) 314 U. S. 201, 211, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86 L. Ed. 152.
(-1939)
306 U. S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed. 940.
--Accord: Broderick v. Rosner, (1935) 294 U. S. 629, 55 S. Ct. 589,
79 L. Ed. 1100.
'"Accord: Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, (1915) 237 U. S. 662, 35 S. Ct.
692, 59 L. Ed. 1169; Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, (1915)
237 U. S. 531. 35 S. Ct. 724. 59 L. Ed. 1089. On similar grounds many
state courts have denied their "jurisdiction" to interfere with the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation; e.g., Relief Assn. v. Equitable Life Assur.
Socicty, (1942) 140 Ohio St. 68, 42 N. E. (2d) 653; Ellis v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., (1939) 237 Ala. 492, 187 So. 434. Such cases represent an application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Blair, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Convniens in Anglo-American Law, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 1, 22, 31.
To decline or to exercise jurisdiction rests in the sound discretion of the
court. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, (1933) 288 U. S. 123,
53 S. Ct. 295, 77 L. Ed. 652, 89 A. L. R. 736; Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co.,
(1915) 215 N. Y. 259, 109 N. E. 250; Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934)
279, Scope Note. But if jurisdiction be assumed the issues "are to be determined upon the ascertainment and proper application of" the law of the
corporate domicile. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, supra.
rn(1935) 294 U. S. 532, 55 S. Ct. 518. 79 L. Ed. 1044.
"'Accord: Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Pink, (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 602.
See Williams v. North Carolina, (U.S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 207, 212 ("Nor is
there any authority which lends support to the view that the full faith and
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tions will be established but, while the judicial current runs as
now, always with reference to the validity and relative weight of
the contesting claims put forward in the name of the several jurisdictions concerned. In the last analysis, of course, that is only a
variation of the "proper law" theory with the Supreme Court serving as final arbiter.9 2
As yet unanswered is the question of a state's domestic or
governmental interest in transactions occurring elsewhere insofar
as they affect only (a) non-residents who have since become residents ;93 (b) non-residents temporarily sojourning within it;9
(c) non-residents who avail themselves of its hospitality solely
to present their claims to the adjudication of its courts.95 But it
will be difficult to gainsay the conclusion of the New York Court
of Appeals that "it cannot be against the public policy of [a]
state to hold nationals to the contracts which they have made in
their own country to be performed there according to the laws of
that country.'96 That appears as applicable to residents of sister
states as to nationals of other countries. Hence something more
than an urge to decide imported controversies according to local
standards will be required to warrant nullification by the forum
of claims recognized elsewhere.
Nevertheless, considering the resurgent view that conflicts
questions are merely questions of local common law17 and the
Supreme Court's evident policy to interfere as little as possible
with state courts,9 s it may be anticipated that, on the whole,

constitutional objections to state court determinations of choiceof-law problems will have to fight their way.
credit clause compels the courts of one state to subordinate the local policy of
that state,
as respects its domiciliaries, to the statutes of any other state.")
92 See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, (1933) 47
L. Rev. 173.
Harv.
93
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